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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT H. HINCKLEY, INC.
a corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
STATE TAX COMMISSION
OF UTAH,
Defendant,
UTAH RETAIL MERCHANTS
ASSOCIATION,
A micus Curiae.

Case No.
10260

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE
RELIEF SOUGHT AND STATEMENT
OF FACTS
The Utah Retail Merchants Association, a voluntary association of retail merchants doing business within the confines of the State of Utah, has
heretofore filed a petition for leave to file a brief
amicus curiae, in which it has requested that it be
permitted to appear and make oral argument in the
above matter.
On the 23rd day of September, 1965, by an
order granting leave to appear as amicus curiae,
signed by Chief Justice F. Henri Henriod, this request was granted.
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This Honorable Court has heretofore made and
entered its decision affirming the decision of the
State Tax Commission sustaining assessments of
sales and use tax deficiencies with respect to the
sale of merchandise by vending machines.
The Court, in the course of its decision, has
made certain observations and statements which we
would like to call to the Court's attention:
Nor has our attention been called to
any provision of our Sales Tax Act which
makes it unlawful or prohibits a vendor from
absorbing or paying the tax himself, if he so
chooses. It does not necessarily follow from
the fact that the 1937 amendment deleted the
provision that the vendor had the option of
collecting from the vendee or absorbing the
tax himself that the legislature intended to
prohibit or make it unlawful for a vendor to
absorb or pay the tax himself. The Act still
provides that the tax shall be collected and
that the vendor is responsible for its collec·
tion * * *
This portion of the decision has raised con·
sternation and questions with respect to the inter·
pretation of Section 59-15-5, Utah Code Annotated
1953, as amended, as it pertains to the collection of
the sales tax by the vendor; whether or not it is
mandatory upon him to collect the same; and
whether or not the 1937 amendment as referred to
in the fore going quoted portion of the opinion, by
substituting the word "shall" for the word "may",
has no meaning or effect.
* * *
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We do not believe that it is the Court's intention and desire to give no meaning to the substitution.
The original statute pertaining to the subject
matter referred to in the herein quoted decision appears in Chapter 20, Laws of Utah 1933, 2nd Special Session, and provides as follows:
Every person receiving any payment or consideration upon a sale of property or service
subject to the tax under the provisions of this
act, or to whom such payment or consideration is payable (hereinafter called the vendor)
shall be responsible for the collection of the
amount of the tax imposed on said sales and
shall, * * * The vendor niay, if he sees fit,
co?lect the tax froni the vendee, * * *
It will be noted that the collection of the sales
tax by the vendor was optional.
This Honorable Court, in the case of W. F.
Jensen Candy Co. v. State Tax Coniniission, 61 P2d
629, in referring to this section made the following statement:
* * * The vendor has the option to collect the
tax from the vendee; that is, he may, "if he
sees fit," do so. He may say to the vendee,
"The tax is so much. You may either pay it
or 'no sale' ", or he may, if he sees fit, elect
to pay or absorb the tax himself. * * *
It is significant that immediately following this
case the Legislature of the State of Utah saw fit
to amend the section of the statute of the 1933 section of the sales tax laws herein quoted. This was
3

done by the 1937 session of the Legislature, and is
as follows:
Sec. 59-15-5.
* * * Every person receiving any payment or
consideration upon a sale of property or service subject to the tax under the provisions
of this act, or to whom such payment or consideration is payable (hereinafter called the
vendor) shall be responsible for the collection of the amount of the tax imposed on said
sale; provided however, that where any sale
of tangible personal property is made by a
wholesaler to a retailer, upon the representation by the said retailer that the said personal property is purchased by the said retailer
for resale, and the said personal property
thereafter is not resold, the wholesaler shall
not be responsible for the collection or payment of the tax imposed on the said sale, but
the said retailer shall be solely liable for the
said tax. The vendor shall collect the tax from
the vendee * * *
'
ARGUMENT
In view of the statements of the majority of
this Honorable Court quoted herein, the question
arises whether the 1937 amendment is just a play
on words; that the Legislature, by substituting the
word "shall" for the word '''may", had no purpose
whatsoever in making such amendment.
We, of course, do not believe that this Honorable Court intended either of the two constructions.
This Honorable Court, in the case of Ralph
Child Construction Company v. State Tax Commis4

sion, 362 P2d 422, made the following statement
with respect to the portion of the statute in question:
It is generally recognized that '·'courts will
give an act such a construction as will accomplish" its purpose. The purpose of this
act was to collect the sales tax from the person liable to pay it without hardship or injustice. The retailer is required to collect the
tax from the consumer and pay it to the Commission as a matter of convenience. But the
primary liability to pay the tax is placed on
the consumer. * * *
We feel that this Court in making the staternen t "the retailer is required to collect the tax"
should dispose of our fears in this matter. However,
we would like to make some observations in regard
to this matter.
The law is fundamental that in every amendment of a statute, the Legislature intended that it
was made to effect some purpose.
It cannot be presumed that it was coincidental
that the Legislature amended the act after the
Court's interpretation in the Jensen case, supra,
where it said the collection was optional, to that of
making it mandatory to collect it.
Certainly the Legislature intended a change
when it changed the statute from the option of the
vendor to collect the tax - 1933 Act, that is, he
vendor may, if he sees fit, collect the tax from the
vendee, to the 1937 amendment, the vendor shall
collect the tax from the vendee.
5

The general rule is that a change in phraseology indicates persuasively, and raises a presumption, that a departure from the old law was intended. It must be assumed that the Legislature had a
reasonable motive.
50 Am. Jur., Sec. 275, Page 261, and cases set

forth therein.
The amendment of an existing act indicates that
a change was intended.
799.

Hopson v. North American Ins. Co. 233 P2d

The presumption is that every amendment of
the statute is made to effect some purpose, and ef·
feet must be given the amended law in a manner
consistent with the amendment.
50 Am. Jur., Sec. 275, Page 262, and cases

set for th therein.
In enacting legislation upon a particular sub·
ject, the law making body is presumed to be familiar not only with its own prior legislation relating
to the subject, but also with the co'urt decisions construing such farmer legislation.
In re Levy, 23 Wash. 2d 607, 161 P2d, 651
ALR 805.
It would seem that there is no other conclusion
than that the Legislature, by amending the statute
immediately after the Jensen case, supra, in the
particular which has been emphasized herein, that
it had the Jensen case in mind when it made the
6

substitution of the word "shall", which we feel is
mandatory, to the option of collecting the sales tax.
This is certainly a reasonable and proper assumption to be made under the facts in this case.
The Utah statute in question is very comparable to that of the State of Washington. We feel
that the case of Morrow vs. Henneford, 47 P2d 1019,
is very pertinent to the question involved herein:
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Section 21 of the act provides that the tax
imposed under title 3 shall be paid by the
buyer to the seller, and it is made a duty of
the seller to collect from the buyer the full
amount of the tax payable in respect of each
sale, and in case any seller fails to collect the
tax, he is primarily liable to the state for the
amount.
The appellant objects to this provision as imposing the burden of an uncompensated service upon him. This provision, as we view it,
is an administrative detail, since the consumer
always ultimately pays. It is the evident purpose of the law to make for honest dealing by
having the purchaser pay the tax in the first
instance, so that no opportunity is offered the
seller to increase the price to the consumer
beyond the definite amount of the tax.
There is some fear under the interpretation of
the decision in this cause that the door is open for
a vendor to absorb or pay the tax, as he chooses.
This of course would be contrary to the interpreta'
tion 'of most merchants
to the effect that the vendor
shall collect the tax.
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If a merchant takes the position that he can
absorb the tax or pay it, as he chooses, he, of course
uses certain advertising gimmicks, such as that the
consumer or purchaser does not have to pay a sales
tax when doing business with him, or that there
is no sales tax at his establishment. This, of course,
opens the door to the purchasing public getting hurt.
Sales tax en large equipment or automobiles amounts
to a substantial sum.

1

If the purchaser relies upon the merchant that
there is no tax, or that the merchant will absorb
it or pay it, and the merchant does not do so, the
purchaser, of course, is then liable in accordance
with Utah law.

As this Honorable Court stated in the Chi/cl
case, supra, where the retailer fails to collect the
tax, the Commission could assess the tax against
the ultimate consumer or purchaser and collect the
same from him.
The act in question here is not the only time
that the Legislature has seen fit to have the purchasing public appraised of a tax. For illustration,
in Section 15-l-2a, Utah Code Annotated 1953, entitled "Conditional sale of tangible personal prop·
erty not to exceed $7500 cash price", the Legislature of the State of Utah, in addition to compelling the seller to set forth the amounts to be paid
to any public officer as fees in connection with the
sales transaction, requires that the seller must set
8

forth in great detail the various items making up
the purchase price of the article sold.
This type of legislation is becoming more prevalent in the various states of the Union as a protection to the purchasing public. It seems to us that
the statute is very clear, that it is mandatory upon
the vendor, to collect the tax. That the Legislature
without question had a purpose and motive in substituting the word "shall" for the previous option
of collecting the tax, as provided in the 1933 Session Laws.
Such an amendment that the Legislatur made
in 1937 was a progressive one and one aimed at
protecting the purchasing public.
It was, also, of course one to assist the Tax
Commission in its auditing procedures with the
\'end ors.
There is no question as to the right of the
Legislature to make it a condition of selling an
article, for the vendor to collect the tax imposed on
the transaction.
Certainly the Legislature had a purpose and
motive in doing this, particularly when we realize
that it was done immediately after the Jensen case,
supra.

It must be remembered that in Utah, if the
l'etailer fails to collect the tax or to report the sale,
or if he should go into bankruptcy, go out of business or become insolvent, then, because this is a
9

tax on the consumer, the consumer is liable therefor.
If -the vendor may absorb or pay the tax him-

self, and so advises the consumer, and does not pay
it, then is not the consumer still liable? Where a
vendor may advertise that he will absorb the tax
or that in his place of business there is no tax to be
paid, and then he does not pay the tax, the consumer must pay it.
Does this not open the door to loose practices
that the Legislature intended to correct by the 1937
amendment? If the door is open to such practices,
the purchasing public can be hurt.
Where a vendor is required to collect the tax
and the vendee or purchaser knows that, and the
sales tax is a part of the purchase price and he so
pays it, then there is no chance of damage to him.
Statutory construction compels the giving of
the amendment a purpose and an effect. This cannot be disregarded.
CONCLUSION
We sincerely feel that the majority of the Court,
by its decision, did not intend to disregard the substitution of the word "shall" for the option of collecting the tax and imply that there was no difference.
We feel that in the absence of a clarification
10

of the Court in this decision, that some confusion
may exist among the selling public. That is, that
a merchant is not required to collect the sales tax,
but that he may absorb or pay it himself, as was his
privilege prior to the 1937 amendment.
We sincerely trust that this Honorable Court
will see its way clear to amend its decision in such
a way as to dispel any confusion or question as to
whether or not the vendor is relieved from his obligation to collect the tax, and that he may not absorb
it or pay it himself and thereby defeat the purpose
of the act, namely, to collect it, so that the purposes
of the act as intended by the Legislature may be
fulfilled.
Respectfully submitted,
LOUIS H. CALLISTER, SR.
LOUIS H. CALLISTER, JR.
Attorneys for Utah Retail
Merchants Association,
A miciis Curiae
800 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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